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Cooperation among nonhuman animals has been the topic of much theoretical and empirical research,
but few studies have examined systematically the effects of various reward payoffs on cooperative behav-
iour. Here, we presented heterosexual pairs of cooperatively breeding cottontop tamarins with a coopera-
tive problem-solving task. In a series of four experiments, we examined how the tamarins’ cooperative
performance changed under conditions in which (1) both actors were mutually rewarded, (2) both actors
were rewarded reciprocally across days, (3) both actors competed for a monopolizable reward and (4) one
actor repeatedly delivered a single reward to the other actor. The tamarins showed sensitivity to the reward
structure, showing the greatest percentage of trials solved and shortest latency to solve the task in the mu-
tual reward experiment and the lowest percentage of trials solved and longest latency to solve the task in
the experiment in which one actor was repeatedly rewarded. However, even in the experiment in which
the fewest trials were solved, the tamarins still solved 46  12% of trials and little to no aggression was
observed among partners following inequitable reward distributions. The tamarins did, however, show
selfish motivation in each of the experiments. Nevertheless, in all experiments, unrewarded individuals
continued to cooperate and procure rewards for their social partners.
 2007 The Association for the Study of Animal Behaviour. Published by Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
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oedipusThere is no universally accepted definition of cooperation.
Some researchers have focused on the behaviour of the
individuals, and define cooperation based on the ability of
actors to coordinate their actions (Boesch & Boesch 1989).
Others have concentrated on the distribution of costs and
benefits, and defined cooperation as any act by one indi-
vidual that benefits one or more other individuals, regard-
less of whether any coordination in action occurred
(Hamilton 1964; Sachs et al. 2004). Interactions that result
in immediate, equal benefits for all actors are categorized
as mutualism or by-product mutualism. In contrast, reci-
procity or reciprocal altruism takes place when repeated
interactions between individuals result in equal benefits
distributed over time (Trivers 1971; Mesterton-Gibbons
& Dugatkin 1997). Here, we use a behaviour-focused defi-
nition in which cooperation occurs when two or more in-
dividuals combine efforts to achieve a common goal, and
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cooperative performance.
Numerous experimental studies have examined coop-
erative problem solving in animals (reviewed in Dugatkin
1997; Tomasello & Call 1997; Noe 2006; Silk, in press).
However, as noted by de Waal & Davis (2003), few studies
have involved systematic manipulation of economic vari-
ables such as the relationship between the effort required
to solve a task and the allocation of rewards to actors. In
one such study, pairs of capuchin monkeys, Cebus apella,
were required to combine efforts to pull a weighted tray
of food towards themselves. The capuchins showed lower
cooperation success when presented with a tray baited for
only one actor when compared with mutualism trials, de-
spite food sharing being common following trials in
which one actor was rewarded (de Waal & Berger 2000).
Hattori et al. (2005) showed that capuchin monkeys,
C. apella, successfully performed complementary actions
for mutual rewards, and then continued to cooperate
but at a lower success rate when only one individual was
rewarded on each trial. In these studies, the experimental45
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session. Additional research is needed to determine how
extended delays between reciprocation (i.e. across days)
are tolerated by the actors and what effects the extended
delays between reciprocation have on the cooperative
performance.
The physical distribution of rewards in space may also
affect cooperative behaviour. Greater cooperation success
may be obtained for dispersed rewards than for clumped
rewards (capuchins, C. apella: de Waal & Davis 2003;
chimpanzees, Pan troglodytes: Melis et al. 2006b). This ef-
fect may be because of dominance interactions or more
generally the degree to which payoffs appear ‘guaranteed’
to the actors. Presumably, when the probability that an
actor will benefit decreases, either because rewards will
be monopolized by a dominant individual or because
the chance of obtaining rewards in a scramble competi-
tion is less than when rewards are delivered directly to
actors, the likelihood that the actors will exert a coopera-
tive effort also decreases because the potential cost to the
actor increases.
Primates may be averse to inequitable distributions of
rewards. Brosnan & de Waal (2003) indicated that female
capuchin monkeys, C. apella, refused to accept rewards
of lesser quality than rewards received by nearby conspe-
cifics. This effect was exaggerated when the recipient of
the higher-quality reward was required to provide less
effort than the subject presented with the lower-quality
reward. Humans also show aversion to inequity in ultima-
tum games, in which participants typically reject pro-
posals by other players to split shares below 25% of the
available amount and instead opt to receive nothing,
even though this action does not maximize the partici-
pant’s self interest (reviewed in Fehr & Fischbacher
2003). Roma et al. (2006) argue that the apparent aversion
to inequity shown by Brosnan & de Waal (2003) may be
explained by frustration due to an individual’s past history
with greater rewards (but see Brosnan & de Waal 2006).
Regardless, either explanation for refusal of rewards (ineq-
uity aversion or frustration) would suggest that actors
would be less likely to cooperate for unequal reward pay-
offs than for equal rewards.
In addition, the social characteristics of a species, such
as their degree of tolerance for nearby conspecifics and
characteristic amount of behavioural coordination, may
influence their ability for both social learning (Coussi-Kor-
bel & Fragaszy 1995) and cooperation (Cronin et al. 2005).
Trivers (1971) noted that in species with strong domi-
nance hierarchies the likelihood of reciprocal altruism is
reduced (in this case reciprocal altruism refers to the distri-
bution of rewards regardless of coordinated action).
Presumably because of high levels of intragroup competi-
tion in Guinea baboons, Papio papio, Japanese macaques,
Macaca fuscata, and rhesus macaques, Macaca mulatta,
these species did not coordinate efforts to move heavy
baited stones (Fady 1972; Burton 1977; Petit et al. 1992),
whereas Tonkean macaques, Macaca tonkeana, character-
ized by less-strict dominance hierarchies and greater social
tolerance, were more often successful at coordinating their
actions to displace the baited stone (Petit et al. 1992).
Consistent with the idea that socioecological contextcan predict performance on cooperative tasks are the ob-
servations that chimpanzees performed better in compet-
itive than in cooperative paradigms (Hare & Tomasello
2004), and that chimpanzees do not choose to donate re-
wards to conspecifics even at no additional cost to them-
selves (Silk et al. 2005; Jensen et al. 2006).
Beyond the general social characteristics of the species,
the nature of the relationship between the specific in-
dividuals faced with a cooperative task may affect their
ability to cooperate. As argued by van Schaik & Kappeler
(2006), individuals bonded over an extended length of
time likely do not evaluate the immediate costs and ben-
efits of their behaviour, but rather the long-term benefits
and costs exchanged throughout the relationship. Domi-
nance asymmetries may also affect cooperative success,
either in the form of coercion by dominants to solve the
task or avoidance of the task by subordinates (chimpan-
zees: Chalmeau 1994; Chalmeau & Gallo 1996; orang-
utans, Pongo pygmaeus: Chalmeau et al. 1997; keas, Nestor
notabilis: Tebbich et al. 1996). Werdenich & Huber (2002)
showed that success on a task requiring common marmo-
sets, Callithrix jacchus, to coordinate behaviours in asym-
metric relationships was contingent upon the dominant
individual receiving the rewards.
In the present study, we examined the effects of
different payoff arrangements on the cooperative behav-
iour of pair-bonded cottontop tamarins, Saguinus oedipus.
Cottontop tamarins are an ideal species for investigating
cooperation as they are socially monogamous cooperative
breeders where both mature offspring and fathers assist in
infant care by carrying and sharing food with younger off-
spring (Snowdon 1996). Tamarins coordinate behaviour
for infant care, travel, food sharing and predator detection
(reviewed in Caine 1993). Previously, we hypothesized
that the high degree of behavioural coordination and
attentiveness to social partners shown by cooperative
breeders would contribute to success on cooperative prob-
lem-solving tasks (Cronin et al. 2005). Indeed, cottontop
tamarins were highly successful at cooperative problem
solving for mutual rewards in the laboratory and showed
an understanding of the role of their partner in the coop-
erative task (Cronin et al. 2005). Moreover, Hauser et al.
(2003) have shown that cottontop tamarins discriminate
between rewards received from a conspecific as a by-prod-
uct of a selfish action or as an altruistic act. Tamarins were
more likely to donate food to conspecifics that had
donated to them altruistically.
The current series of experiments examines the effects
of varied reward distributions on the cooperative behav-
iour of unrelated pairs of socially bonded cottontop
tamarins. The dyads in this study had been housed
together for at least 5 years at the onset of this study
and all appeared to have a strong social bond with their
partner. Unlike previous studies, we examined the effects
of reciprocal reward delays extending beyond a single test
session. Specifically, experiment 1 was designed to estab-
lish the tamarins’ baseline performance on a mutualistic
cooperative task; experiment 2 examined how the tama-
rins’ performance changed when only one tamarin ben-
efits from the cooperative act within a session, but the
rewarded individual was alternated between sessions
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tamarins’ cooperative success for a single, monopolizable
reward; experiment 4 measured whether cooperation
persisted when only one individual in the dyad benefited





We tested four pairs of unrelated cottontop tamarins at
the University of Wisconsin, Madison. Each pair consisted
of an adult female and a vasectomized male and all were
subjects of our previous cooperation study (Cronin et al.
2005). The tamarins were housed in indoor cages con-
structed of anodized aluminium framing and poly-
urethane-coated steel mesh. Cages measured either
160  236  93 cm (L  H W) or 236  220  186 cm.
They included natural branches, wooden planks and ropes
to simulate an arboreal environment. All tamarins were
housed in rooms containing multiple cages but were iso-
lated from each other visually by opaque fabric sheets.
All subjects had ad libitum access to water and were not
food deprived. For additional husbandry information,
see Ginther et al. (2001).
Apparatus
The apparatus (Fig. 1a) was a small, clear Plexiglas box
that contained two sliding trays, positioned one on top
of the other with one tray protruding from either side.
The apparatus measured 15  13  4 cm (L  H W)
with ledges extending 20 cm on either side. The portion
of the tray external to the apparatus on either side con-
tained a handle to allow the subject to pull and extend
the tray. The handles were 20 cm apart and positioned op-
posite each other so that a single subject could not pull
both handles simultaneously. Inside the apparatus, each
tray had two holes located such that when the handles
were simultaneously extended the holes aligned vertically.
This allowed the rewards placed in the holes on the top
tray to fall to the floor of the apparatus, one reward to
each subject. Elastic bands were attached to the trays caus-
ing the trays to retract immediately when the subject
stopped exerting tension on the handle. Thus, both sub-
jects had to exert tension simultaneously on the handles
to align the holes (Cronin et al. 2005).
Training
All subjects of the current experiment had participated
in a previous experiment with the same apparatus (Cronin
et al. 2005); therefore no additional training was required.
Testing procedure
A median of 26.02 months (range 25e29, calculated as
30-day periods) elapsed since the completion of the
previous cooperation experiment and the onset of the
current experiment. Each pair participated in 10 sessionsof eight trials each. All test sessions were videotaped. A test
session began as soon as the experimenter finished baiting
the apparatus and left the area. A test session was
terminated when tamarins completed all trials or had
ceased pulling handles for at least 3 min during a trial. A
trial began when the apparatus was baited and ended
when rewards were released from the apparatus because
of simultaneous extension of the handles. The next trial
began when the subjects finished eating the rewards
(approximately 30 s).
For all sessions, pulling behaviour at the apparatus and
latencies to first pull and to solve the trial were scored
from videotapes. A pull was defined as a full extension of
an apparatus handle, using one or both hands, until the
screw of the handle encountered the apparatus wall
producing an audible click. Only full extension of the
handle was scored as a pull. All pulls were recorded as
occurring on the left or right side of the apparatus.
Videotapes were viewed in slow motion when a pull was
difficult to score. Cases in which a tamarin fully extended
a handle, let it retract, then fully extended it again
without removing its hands from the apparatus were




Figure 1. Side view of the apparatus. The dark portions of the trays
inside the apparatus indicate holes; when the trays are simulta-
neously extended from opposite sides of the apparatus, the holes
line up and the reward(s) fall to the floor of the apparatus. (a) The
apparatus used in experiments 1 and 2. In experiment 2 only one
side of the apparatus was baited per session. (b) The apparatus
used in experiment 3. The trays contain only one hole each, and
a single reward is placed within the clear cylinder equidistant from
both sides of the apparatus upon baiting. (c) The apparatus used
in experiment 4. Only one side of the apparatus was baited for the
duration of the experiment, and the chute inside the apparatus
delivered the reward across from the individual on the baited side.
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To establish reliability, 20% of the sessions were ran-
domly selected and coded by a second observer. Interob-
server reliability was 95%with respect to pulling behaviour
(animal ID, number of pulls, and side on which the pull
occurred). All P values reported in this and the following
experiments are two tailed. Standard errors are reported
following means.
The percentage of trials solved per session was calcu-
lated conservatively as the number of trials the pair solved
divided by the total number of trials possible in that
session had they continued to solve the trials (eight). For
example, if a tamarin pair did not solve the fourth trial in
a session, the session was ended and the pair was scored as
having solved three of eight or 37.5% trials in that session.
Percentage efficiency was calculated as the number of
pulls required by a pair to solve a trial/the number of pulls
executed by a pair on a trial  100%.
Results
Task performance
The tamarins solved a mean of 99.33  0.68% of trials
(N ¼ 307). In the previous cooperation study (Cronin
et al. 2005), the same subjects solved 96.84  1.01% of
trials (N ¼ 612). The tamarins showed a mean percentage
efficiency of 50.18  4.36%. The percentage efficiency in
our previous cooperation study (Cronin et al. 2005) with
the same tamarin pairs was nearly identical, at
50.33  7.32%. The tamarins’ mean latency to solve the
task was 15.04  3.98 s. Again this performance measure
is similar to the tamarins’ previous performance on the
task, 16.40  4.34 s. None of the above performance mea-
sures differed significantly from the results presented in
Cronin et al. (2005); paired t tests: P values >0.10.
Side preferences
All tamarins showed a strong side preference in this
experiment, reliably pulling from one side of the appara-
tus or the other to solve the task (86.9% of trials were
solved when tamarins occupied their preferred side). The
side preferences shown by the subjects in experiment 1
were the same preferences shown by the same pairs during
the study approximately 26 months earlier.
Discussion
Experiment 1 provides updated performance measures
for the tamarins on the mutualism task; these updated
performance measures were necessary to enable accurate
comparisons with experiments 2e4 in which reward
schemes are manipulated. The tamarins showed strong
cooperative task performance for equal reward payoffs as
measured by percentage of trials solved, efficiency and
latency to solve the task. These performance measures
were very similar to their previous experience with the
task 26 months prior, showing long-term memory for the
task and no need for additional training prior to addi-
tional experiments. Additionally, we confirmed thetamarins’ strong side preferences, which enabled us to
bias the reward distribution in the following experiment.
EXPERIMENT 2: RECIPROCAL REWARDS
We made use of the side preferences expressed by the
tamarins in experiment 1 to determine whether coopera-
tive performance would change when only one individu-
al’s preferred side was baited within a session, but the
rewarded side was alternated between sessions. Because
tamarins often show distress when physically separated
from their mates, we decided to use the side preferences to
create the desired reciprocal reward distribution rather
than physically restrict their access to one side of the
apparatus or the other. Although the reward distribution
would have been more tightly controlled by separating
the subjects and restricting the tamarins’ access to the
apparatus, this approach would have limited the social
relevance of the task. Experiment 2 differs from previous
studies of reciprocal reward payoffs (de Waal & Berger
2000; Hauser et al. 2003; Hattori et al. 2005) in that ben-
efits to actors are generally separated by at least 1 day,
rather than balanced within a single session. Therefore,




The subjects and apparatus of experiment 2 were the
same as those in experiment 1.
Testing procedure
Forty-five days elapsed between the final session of
experiment 1 and the first session of experiment 2. Each
pair participated in 10 sessions. Each session consisted of
a maximum of eight trials, with a 90-s intertrial interval
(ITI). Only one side of the apparatus was baited per
session. Because the apparatus was transparent, the tam-
arins could see from a distance which side of the apparatus
was baited. The baited side was held constant on all trials
within a session and alternated between sessions. As in
experiment 1, simultaneous extension of the handles
from opposite sides of the apparatus was required to
release the reward. However, a key difference was that
simultaneous pulling only delivered a reward to the
tamarin on the baited side of the apparatus whereas the
other animal obtained no food. Sessions ended when
tamarins completed eight trials or failed to solve a trial in
10 min. Notice that this termination criterion differs from
experiment 1 in which a trial ended if the tamarins ceased
pulling handles for 3 min because a trial could continue
indefinitely in the one-reward task if a tamarin pulled at
the baited side only. At least 24 h elapsed between
sessions. Time elapsed between sessions averaged 3.39
( 0.34) days and ranged from 1 to 11 days.
The behavioural measures used in experiment 1 were
also used in experiment 2. Additionally, we recorded the
identity of the rewarded individual and whether each pull
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interested in observing the tamarins’ interactions with
their partner following trials and added a 90-s ITI. During
the ITI we recorded all occurrences of 32 behaviours from
our laboratory’s standard ethogram for social interactions
using Noldus Observer Version 5.0 (Noldus Information
Technology, Wageningen, The Netherlands).
Data analysis
We used paired comparisons (Student’s t tests, two
tailed) between experiments 1 and 2 to determine
whether the performance changed when only one tama-
rin received a reward per trial. Student’s t tests were chosen
for between-experiment comparisons because although




















Figure 2. Percentage success (mean  SEM) for all experiments.
Planned t tests were conducted between mutualism and reciprocal
reward (P ¼ 0.041), reciprocal reward and centred reward
(P ¼ 0.907), and reciprocal reward and del ivered reward
(P ¼ 0.124). *P < 0.05.to type I errors when distributions are not highly skewed
(Pearson & Please 1975). Effect sizes are included and
were calculated as specified by Gibbons et al. (1993) for
paired comparisons. Twenty per cent of the sessions
were randomly selected and coded for reliability by a
second observer. Interobserver reliability was 94% with
respect to pulling behaviour and 100% with respect to
identity of the rewarded animal.
Results
Task performance
The tamarins continued to solve the task when only one
reward was present, solving an average of 76.20  7.09%
of trials (N ¼ 320) over 10 sessions. This was a significant
decrease from experiment 1 in which 99.32% of the trials
were solved (paired t test t3 ¼ 3.449, P ¼ 0.041, d ¼ 1.725,
Fig. 2). Interestingly, all pairs solved 100% of the trials in
the first one or two sessions, and then showed a sharp
drop in the percentage of trials solved in the third and/
or fourth sessions. Two of the pairs then resumed their
previous level of performance and continued solving
100% of the trials for the remainder of the sessions. The
other two pairs solved a varied percentage of trials in the
remaining sessions (Fig. 3).
To further examine the observed variation in percentage
success, we analysed whether there was an effect of the
number of days that had elapsed since the individual on
the unbaited side had been the recipient of rewards. An
analysis of variance indicated no effect of number of days
elapsed between sessions on percentage success (analysis
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Figure 3. Percentage of trials solved and percentage of rewards received in experiment 2, reciprocal reward. The line indicates the percentage
of trials solved. Black bars indicate the percentage of rewards received by the female, white bars represent the percentage of rewards received
by the male (percentages calculated out of total number of rewards possible each session regardless of whether the trial was solved). Pair 2 was
the only pair in which one partner received significantly more rewards than the other (P ¼ 0.010). Sessions in which both the male and the
female received rewards indicate sessions in which the tamarins solved at least one trial on their nonpreferred side.
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not significantly different from the efficiency shown by the
tamarins in experiment 1 (paired t test: t3 ¼ 1.999,
P ¼ 0.140, d ¼ 0.999). The tamarins took longer to solve
the task, as latency to solve the task significantly increased
from experiment 1 to experiment 2, from 15.05  3.98 s
to 24.08  4.73 s (paired t test: t3 ¼ 6.096, P ¼ 0.009,
d ¼ 3.048, Fig. 4).
The tamarins made significantly more pulls per trial
when the side that they currently occupied was baited
than when the side that their partner occupied was baited
(paired t test: t7 ¼ 4.7924, P ¼ 0.002, d ¼ 1.694). Therefore,
the tamarins pulled more often to deliver the reward to
themselves than to deliver the reward to their partner.
Side preferences and reward distribution
All tamarins continued to show side preferences (97.1%
of trials were solved when tamarins occupied their pre-
ferred side). In three of the five sessions in which at least
one trial was solved on a tamarin’s nonpreferred side, the
tamarins achieved 100% success, thus indicating that the
side preferences were not necessary for success. The side
preferences shown by the subjects were the same prefer-
ences shown during experiment 1.
In three of the four pairs, reward distribution did not
differ from 50% to each partner over the course of 10
sessions (binomial test: pair 1 P ¼ 0.731, N ¼ 76, pair 3
P ¼ 1.000, N ¼ 63, pair 4 P ¼ 0.672, N ¼ 50); in pair 2, the
female received significantly more rewards than the male
(binomial test: P ¼ 0.020, N ¼ 54). In this pair, the female
pulled on the unbaited side less frequently than the male,
in effect not allowing him asmany rewards as she obtained.
As expected, within each session, reward distribution was
strongly biased towards the individual that preferred the
side that was baited during that session, and the rewarded
individual alternated between sessions (Fig. 3).
Social behaviour
Because of the low frequency of occurrence of many of
the behaviours recorded during the ITI, statistical analyses

































Figure 4. Latency to solve the task (mean  SEM) for all experiments.
Planned t tests were conducted betweenmutualism and reciprocal re-
ward (P ¼ 0.009), reciprocal reward and centred reward (P ¼ 0.566),
and reciprocal reward and delivered reward (P ¼ 0.028). *P < 0.05;
**P < 0.01.were not possible. Tamarins often returned to the appara-
tus to await the next trial after the reward was consumed.
However, aggressive behaviours directed from one tamarin
to another occurred extremely rarely, despite the fact that
during a session one cooperating tamarin was continu-
ously denied rewards while their partner received rewards.
Following 243 successful trials in experiment 2 (364.5 min
of observation) there was one instance each of a threat
face and frown at partner, three of piloerection, seven of
one tamarin jumping on the other, and no instances of
a tamarin biting, grabbing, or wrestling with their partner.
This equates to a rate of one potentially aggressive inci-
dent every 20.3 trials. Food sharing was observed once.
Discussion
Tamarins solved significantly fewer trials and took
longer to solve trials when both individuals did not
benefit immediately and equally for their efforts as in
experiment 1. However, the tamarins still solved 76% of
the trials. Furthermore, tamarins cooperated for reciprocal
rewards separated over days, even after a delay of 11 days
between sessions. In most tamarin pairs, we observed
reciprocity across sessions with each tamarin receiving
equal rewards over the course of the experiment. Aggres-
sion between tamarins was extremely rare, even though
within most sessions only one tamarin received rewards
for their cooperative efforts. Yet animals did show some
selfish motivation, as evidenced by a greater rate of
pulling when the side they occupied would be rewarded
and lack of food sharing with their partner. One limitation
of this experiment was that the side preferences, although
they enabled the reciprocal reward distribution, did not
allow us to analyse how the tamarins would respond to
a situation in which a single, monopolizable reward is
produced from the cooperative act but the individual who
will ultimately gain access to the reward is unknown
to the actors prior to cooperating. Experiment 3 was
designed to address this question.
EXPERIMENT 3: CENTRED REWARD
In experiment 3, we modified the apparatus design so that
a single, monopolizable reward was delivered equidistant
from both subjects upon completion of the cooperative
act, and the identity of the rewarded animal could not be
known before the tamarins engaged in cooperation.
Methods
Subjects and apparatus
The subjects of experiment 3 were the same as those in
experiments 1 and 2. For experiment 3, the apparatus was
modified such that the trays within the apparatus had
only a single, centred hole. A clear cylindrical piece was
added to the inside of the apparatus to ensure that when
baited, the single reward rested atop the trays equidistant
from both subjects. When the trays were simultaneously
extended from opposite sides of the apparatus, the reward
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piece of Plexiglas on the floor of the apparatus was
removed, and two small pieces of Plexiglas were secured
to ensure that the reward remained at the centre and did
not roll towards one subject (Fig. 1b).
Testing procedure
Seven months elapsed between the final session of
experiment 2 and the first session of experiment 3. Each
pair participated in 10 sessions, except for one pair (pair 3)
that participated in nine sessions because of a problem
with the apparatus during one session. Each session
consisted of a maximum of eight trials. Sessions ended
when tamarins either completed all eight trials or failed to
solve a trial in 10 min. The next session occurred as sched-
uled. At least 24 h elapsed between sessions with an aver-
age of 1.81  0.22 days between sessions and a range of
1e5 days. There was a 90-s ITI and sessions were video-
taped and scored as in experiment 2. During video scoring
of experiment 3 we also scored whether each subject made
an attempt to retrieve the reward from the centre of the
apparatus floor upon solving the task. A ‘grab’ was scored
whenever any part of the tamarin’s body crossed the side
plane of the apparatus into the bottom of the apparatus
where the food reward was located.
Data analysis
Paired comparisons of experiments 2 and 3 were used to
determine whether the tamarins’ performance changed
between the condition during which one tamarin was
guaranteed to receive a reward and the other was not
versus the condition in which neither tamarin was
guaranteed a reward for the cooperative act. Twenty per
cent of the sessions were randomly selected and coded for
reliability by a second observer. Interobserver reliability
was 96% with respect to pulling behaviour and 100% with
respect to identity of the rewarded animal.
Results
Task performance
The tamarins continued to solve the task when a single,
centred reward was present, solving an average of
77.71  15.68% of the trials (N ¼ 304). This was not sig-
nificantly different from the percentage of trials solved
in experiment 2 (paired t test: t3 ¼ 0.1275, P ¼ 0.907,
d ¼ 0.064), however, the pairs displayed more variation
in experiment 3 (Fig. 2).
Percentage efficiency was 58.57  10.45%, not signifi-
cantly different from the efficiency shown by the tamarins
in experiment 2 (paired t test: t3 ¼ 2.162, P ¼ 0.119,
d ¼ 1.081). Latency to solve the task also did not differ
significantly from experiment 2 to experiment 3; latency
to solve the task in experiment 2 was 24.08  4.73 s
and in experiment 3 was 32.12  13.35 s (paired t test:
t3 ¼ 0.6423, P ¼ 0.566, d ¼ 0.321, Fig. 4).
Side preferences and reward distribution
All tamarins continued to show side preferences (91.5%
of trials were solved when tamarins occupied their pre-
ferred side). The side preferences shown by the subjects inexperiment 3 were the same preferences shown during
experiments 1 and 2.
In three of the four pairs, rewards received by each
partner did not differ significantly from 50% (binomial
test: pair 2: P ¼ 0.813, N ¼ 71; pair 3: P ¼ 0.162, N ¼ 62;
pair 4: P ¼ 0.690, N ¼ 25); in pair 1 the male received sig-
nificantly more rewards than the female (binomial test:
P ¼ 0.050, N ¼ 76). In contrast to experiment 2 in which
reward distribution was unequal within a session but
equal across sessions, reward distributions were generally
equal within sessions (Fig. 5).
We analysed the subjects’ attempts to retrieve the
reward once the task was solved to determine whether
the reward distribution was a result of the tamarins
actively deferring rewards to their partners, or simply
due to chance. We first verified that within each pair, the
subjects had equal chances of obtaining the reward if they
both grabbed for it. Chi-squared analyses indicated that
within each pair, on trials when both subjects grabbed for
the reward, the distribution of rewards did not signifi-
cantly differ from 50% to each subject (pair 1: c1
2 ¼ 0.472,
P ¼ 0.492; pair 2: c12 ¼ 1.473, P ¼ 0.225; pair 3: c12 ¼ 0.348,
P ¼ 0.56; pair 4: c12 ¼ 2.579, P ¼ 0.108).
The percentage of trials on which an individual did not
grab ranged from 6.58% to 23.68% (X SE ¼ 12:45
2:19%). The tamarin that showed the greatest percentage
of trials without grabbing was the same individual (Sc)
that received significantly fewer rewards than her partner
(In). Seventy-two per cent of the trials on which the fe-
male did not grab for the reward were in the first half of
sessions. It appears that the unequal reward distribution
in this pair may be attributed to the female learning
more slowly than her partner to reach inside the apparatus
for the single reward. In the three pairs that showed re-
ward distributions not significantly different from 50%
to each actor, both tamarins grabbed for the reward on
88% of trials. Thus, the equal reward distribution did
not appear to be facilitated by individuals deferring re-
wards to their partners, but rather by the equal chance
that the tamarins would retrieve the reward given that
they both grabbed for it.
Social behaviour
After a trial was solved the tamarins were forced to
scramble for the reward that was delivered to the centre of
the apparatus floor. Even in this highly competitive
situation, aggression was nearly absent. Following 234
successful trials (351 min of observation) there was one in-
stance each of a bite and wrestle, two of piloerection and
grab at partner, and no instances of a tamarin delivering
a threat face towards, jumping on or frowning at their
partner. This equates to a rate of one potentially aggressive
incident every 39 trials. There were no instances of food
sharing in experiment 3.
Discussion
Tamarins continued to cooperate and show high success
and efficiency for a single, monopolizable reward. Reward
distribution did not significantly differ from 50% to each
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Figure 5. Percentage of trials solved and percentage of rewards received in experiment 3, centred reward. The line indicates the percentage of
trials solved. Black bars indicate the percentage of rewards received by the female (percentage calculated out of total number of rewards pos-
sible each session regardless of whether the trial was solved), white bars represent the percentage of rewards received by the male. Pair 1 was
the only pair in which one partner received significantly more rewards than the other (P ¼ 0.025).actor in three of the four pairs; however, this did not
appear to be because of any active effort by the subjects to
minimize inequality. As in experiment 2, aggression was
virtually absent and individuals continued to participate
even though they were required to compete for the reward
upon completion of the cooperative act.
EXPERIMENT 4: DELIVERED REWARD
Experiments 1e3 provide evidence that tamarins will
cooperate when rewards are equalized over time, whether
they are immediately equal after each cooperative act
(experiment 1), equal across sessions/days (experiment 2),
or equal within a session/day (experiment 3). However, we
do not know to what extent cooperative behaviour would
be maintained if the reward distribution to actors remains
unequal throughout the duration of the experiment. The
aim of experiment 4 was to determine whether the
tamarins would continue to cooperate when the same




The subjects of experiment 4 were the same as those in
experiments 1, 2 and 3. For experiment 4, the apparatus
was similar to the apparatus used in experiment 2; that is,
the trays had two reward locations, one near each
tamarin. However, in this experiment, one side of the
apparatus was baited for the duration of the experiment.
Additionally, a diagonal chute was added that, upon
simultaneous extension of the trays, caused the rewardlocated near one tamarin to be delivered to the tamarin at
the other side of the apparatus (Fig. 1c).
Testing procedure
The side of the apparatus to be baited was determined
randomly for each pair before the onset of the experi-
ment. This resulted in two pairs for which the male’s
preferred side was baited and rewards were delivered to the
female’s preferred side, and two pairs for which the
female’s preferred side was baited and rewards were
delivered to the male’s preferred side. Note that the
subject on the unbaited side would always receive the
reward because of the design of the apparatus.
Nine months elapsed between the final session of
experiment 3 and the first session of experiment 4. Each
session consisted of a maximum of eight trials, and the
subjects participated in 10 sessions. Sessions ended when
tamarins either completed all eight trials or failed to solve
a trial in 10 min. The next session occurred as scheduled.
At least 24 h elapsed between sessions. Time elapsed be-
tween sessions averaged 1.22 ( 0.11) days and ranged
from 1 to 3 days. There was a 90-s ITI and sessions were
videotaped and scored in the same manner as in experi-
ment 3, with the exception of ‘grab’, which was no longer
relevant.
Data analysis
Paired comparisons of experiments 2 and 4 were used to
determine whether the tamarins’ performance changed
between the condition in which both tamarins pulled to
release a reward to the tamarin on the baited side, and
a condition in which both tamarins pulled but one
tamarin was delivering a reward to the tamarin on the
CRONIN & SNOWDON: COOPERATION FOR UNEQUAL REWARDS 253opposite side of the apparatus. Twenty per cent of the
sessions were randomly selected and coded for reliability
by a second observer. Interobserver reliability was 90%
with respect to pulling behaviour and 100% with respect
to the identity of the rewarded animal.
Results
Task performance
Percentage of trials solved in experiment 4 decreased to
46.25  12.45%. This percentage of trials solved was not
significantly different from the percentage of trials solved
in experiment 2 (paired t test: t3 ¼ 2.125, P ¼ 0.124,
d ¼ 1.063, Fig. 2). Failure to reject the null hypothesis of
no change in percentage of trials solved should be inter-
preted cautiously, as the power to detect the large effect
size observed here is only 0.317 because of the small sam-
ple size in this study. The pairs showed less consistent trial
solving than in previous experiments; for example, two
pairs did not solve any trials for five continuous sessions,
one pair oscillated between solving the majority of trials
and solving very few, and the final pair showed a relatively
consistent decrease in percentage of trials solved over ses-
sions (Fig. 6).
Percentage efficiency was 43.79  9.66%. This percent-
age efficiency was not significantly different from the per-
centage efficiency shown in experiment 2 (paired t test:
t3 ¼ 0.003, P ¼ 0.998, d ¼ 0.002). Latency to solve the task
increased significantly between experiment 2 and
experiment 4, from 24.08  4.73 s to 37.86  7.04 s (paired
t test: t3 ¼ 4.009, P ¼ 0.028, d ¼ 2.004, Fig. 4).
The reward was delivered to the tamarin away from
the tamarin that pulled the handle closest to the reward.This was the opposite of the reward scheme used in
experiment 2. The tamarins appeared to learn this reward
scheme during the course of the experiment. Pair 4
virtually stopped responding after session 5 (Fig. 6). Of
the remaining pairs, the average percentage of trials in
which the first pull was made on the donor’s side of the
apparatus was 65.02  14.56% in sessions 1e5, whereas
it was only 20.70  2.07% in sessions 6e10. Because the
tamarins adhered strongly to their side preferences
(94.79  0.02% of all pulls were made on the preferred
side), the tamarin preassigned as the donor tamarin initi-
ated more trials in early sessions than in later sessions.
Side preferences and reward distribution
All tamarins continued to show side preferences (97.3%
of trials were solved when tamarins occupied their pre-
ferred side). The side preferences shown by the subjects
were the same preferences shown during previous
experiments.
Reward distribution in experiment 4 was highly biased
towards the individual on the unbaited side, as designed.
Two animals received 100% of the rewards, one received
94% and one 93% (Fig. 6). Reward distribution differing
from 100% to a single actor indicates at least one trial
on which side preferences were reversed.
Social behaviour
Following all trials of experiment 4, only one individual
received a reward after both exerted effort to solve the
task. However, as in the previous experiments, aggression
was rare. Following 148 successful trials (222 min of obser-
vation) there was one instance each of an animal display-
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Figure 6. Percentage of trials solved and percentage of rewards received in experiment 4, delivered reward. The line indicates the percentage
of trials solved. Black bars indicate the percentage of rewards received by the female (percentage calculated out of total number of rewards
possible each session regardless of whether the trial was solved), white bars represent the percentage of rewards received by the male. In all
pairs one individual received more rewards than their partner. Sessions in which both the male and the female received rewards indicate ses-
sions in which the tamarins solved at least one trial on their nonpreferred side.
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a threat face, or jumping on their partner. This equates
to a rate of one potentially aggressive incident every
49.3 trials. There were no instances of food sharing in
experiment 4.
Discussion
Experiment 4 examined whether the tamarins would
continue to cooperate when the same actor was repeatedly
rewarded and the other actor received nothing. We found
that the tamarins solved46%of trials in this condition. This
is anonsignificant decrease fromexperiment 2 inwhich the
rewarded individual was alternated between sessions (76%
of trials solved). However, the inconsistent performance of
the pairs (Fig. 6) indicates that the delivered reward may be
a less conducive environment to cooperation and the non-
significant finding may be because of lack of power in this
study. The tamarins showed a significantly longer latency
to solve the task in the delivered reward experiment
compared with the mutual reward experiment. The transi-
tion from the donor to the recipient initiating themajority
of first pulls of each trial indicates that the tamarins learned
the new reward scheme during the experiment, yet this
does not cause cooperative behaviour of the donor to
extinguish in the following sessions (Fig. 6).
GENERAL DISCUSSION
Overall, we found that the tamarins’ cooperative perfor-
mance was sensitive to the rewards they would receive
following their cooperative effort. When actors worked for
mutual rewards (experiment 1), their cooperative perfor-
mance was highest, nearing 100%. When the distribution
of rewards was altered to provide reciprocal reward payoffs
to the actors, the tamarins’ cooperative success signifi-
cantly decreased to 76%, showing sensitivity to the
reciprocal reward scheme. However, it should be noted
that percentage success in this study was calculated
conservatively (if a pair did not solve a trial mid-session
in the maximum time allotted, the session was ended and
they were scored as failing all remaining trials in that
session as well). Additionally, we do not know whether
cooperation would have recommenced within a session if
sessions were not ended after the maximum trial length
was reached. Direct comparisons with other species are
not possible since no other species have been tested on
the apparatus used in these experiments, however, co-
operative success of 76% is higher than or comparable
with other cooperative problem-solving experiments with
nonhuman primates with single or mutual rewards
(capuchins, Cebus apella: Mendres & de Waal 2000; de
Waal & Berger 2000; de Waal & Davis 2003; Hattori
et al. 2005; Brosnan et al. 2006; chimpanzees: Melis
et al. 2006a).
The tamarins solved a similar percentage of trials in
experiments 2 and 3, indicating that the tamarins may be
equally successful at solving the cooperative task when
there is a single monopolizable reward present, regardless
of whether the individual to be rewarded is identified priorto the cooperative act (experiment 2) or following the
cooperative act (experiment 3). Experiment 4 was the only
experiment that did not provide the tamarins with equal
reward distribution over repeated interactions, and in this
situation the tamarins performed least well with the
longest latency to solve the task and the lowest percentage
of trials solved. However, they still solved nearly half of
the trials. The results of this series of experiments indicate
that tamarins continue to cooperate when not equally
rewarded, but are sensitive to reward distributions
and will cooperate most often when both individuals
receive rewards either simultaneously or over repeated
interactions.
Even when several days elapsed between the exchange
of donor and recipient roles in the reciprocal reward
experiment (experiment 2) the tamarins solved the ma-
jority of trials. We believe the tamarins’ success on this
delayed reciprocity task was most likely due to what de
Waal & Luttrell (1988) have termed ‘symmetry based rec-
iprocity’, an explanation for reciprocity that does not
require any complex cognitive score-keeping of past inter-
actions. Symmetry-based reciprocity is characterized by
‘exchanges between closely bonded individuals who
help each other without stipulating equivalent returns’
(de Waal & Luttrell 1988, p. 103). Given the long-term
pair bonds between the tamarins in this study, their suc-
cess could likely be explained by this type of reciprocity.
Characteristically, the tamarin dyads in this study have
shown no signs of aggression, slept together nightly, hud-
dled with and groomed each other during the day, and fed
simultaneously in proximity with each other. Callitrichids
are strongly interdependent on each other for survival and
reproductive success. Their relationships have been de-
scribed as valuable and secure, with aggression being
very rare (Schaffner & Caine 2000; Aureli & Schaffner
2006). Therefore, perhaps the simplest explanation for
the tamarins’ success on the reciprocal reward task is
that they do not ‘keep score’ with each other, and isolated
asymmetric interactions are relatively unimportant in the
larger context of their relationship.
Results of many studies indicate that the nature of the
relationship between actors will play a role in their
cooperative success. Brosnan et al. (2005) have shown
that chimpanzees with long-term relationships are
more tolerant of inequitable reward distributions. Also,
Beck (1973) found that the only two hamadryas
baboons, Papio hamadryas, in a captive group to show
cooperative tool use were two individuals in a bonded
pair. Recent evidence suggests that while chimpanzees
in long-term adulteadult pairs interact reciprocally
with each other, reciprocity does not persist similarly
in mothereoffspring pairs (S. Yamamoto & M. Tanaka,
unpublished data). Melis et al. (2006b) showed that
pairs of chimpanzees that were more likely to share
food outside of the testing situation showed greater suc-
cess on a cooperative task, indicating that the nature of
the relationship between actors will play a role in their
success. These observations indicate that the nature of
the relationship between actors may affect their cooper-
ative performance and tolerance for temporarily unequal
reward distributions.
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throughout all single reward conditions, the rate of
aggression was highest during the first exposure to
a condition in which tamarins were not equally re-
warded (experiment 2). Rates of aggression were then
lower during the competitive experiment (experiment
3), and the lowest during experiment 4, in which one
animal was repeatedly unrewarded. Therefore, the ag-
gressive encounters observed may have stemmed from
the tamarins’ adjustment to the schemes involving one
reward after having repeatedly received mutual rewards
rather than a direct response to the competition with
their partner or unfair reward distribution. These find-
ings are similar to those of Rapaport (1998) in which ag-
gression in golden lion tamarins, Leontopithecus rosalia,
was reliably predicted by search time during a foraging
task but not by reward abundance. Notably, aggression
by the golden lion tamarins was very infrequent, as it
was in the current study.
The design of experiment 4 biased the reward distri-
bution such that the same individual was likely to be
rewarded after every cooperative act for the duration of
the experiment. In one pair (pair 3) we observed
decreasing cooperative success as sessions proceeded,
the pattern we expected to find if the unrewarded
tamarin became increasingly unwilling to cooperate
without any payoff. However, the other three pairs did
not display this pattern of decline, appearing to co-
operate sporadically, with two pairs failing to cooperate
for five or more consecutive sessions before resuming
cooperation. There are many potential reasons for their
varied performance. One possible explanation is that the
unrewarded individuals are willing to cooperate, just not
as often as when they received half the rewards.
Alternatively, the unrewarded individuals could have
been cooperating sporadically to investigate whether
the reward scheme had changed. Given that the subjects
had been through many different reward scenarios by
the time they participated in experiment 4, they may
have been sampling the experiment to determine
whether it would benefit them to resume cooperation.
Finally, Schuster & Perelberg (2004) have suggested that
cooperation may be intrinsically rewarding as a social
interaction. This perspective may elucidate why individ-
uals may choose to cooperate when their behaviours
cannot be explained entirely by tangible rewards.
Noe (2006) recently suggested that the tamarins’ pre-
vious cooperative performance in the mutualism task
(Cronin et al. 2005) may be explained by conditioning;
specifically that the tamarins learned that pulling in the
presence of their partner led to a reward. Although the
conditioned response explanation might account for
the tamarins’ performance in the experiments in which
both individuals were rewarded for coordinating their
pulling behaviour (Cronin et al. 2005, experiment 1
this study), the conditioned response explanation can-
not account for the tamarins’ performance in experi-
ments 2e4. In experiment 2, the tamarins adjusted
their rate of pulling based on whether the reward would
be delivered to them or to their partner, yet they con-
tinued pulling in both situations and solved themajority of trials, even though their reduced pulling
behaviour indicates that they learned they were unlikely
to receive a reward when they occupied the unbaited
side. In experiment 2, the pairs showed a decline in suc-
cess after the first few sessions, and then a subsequent
reinstatement of success (two pairs) or variable success
(two pairs) over the remaining sessions. If the tamarins’
performance could be explained by a simple condi-
tioned response to pull in the presence of the partner,
we would expect to see consistently high performance
across all sessions of experiment 2 and experiment 3,
especially since learning theory predicts that variable
schedules of reinforcement lead to more persistent be-
haviour (Hilgard & Bower 1966). In experiment 4, we
saw that the tamarins’ motivation to pull was based
not only on the presence or absence of the partner
but also the likelihood that they would be rewarded.
In these experiments, the tamarins were not showing
an automatic response but rather attending to the differ-
ent reward scenarios presented in each experiment.
Additionally, in all of the above experiments there was
evidence for some selfish motivation, but their perfor-
mance cannot be explained by selfish motivation alone.
A limitation of this study is that the effect of previous
cooperative experience cannot be determined. All subjects
in this study were first exposed to a cooperative task
in which both individuals received rewards, and then
subsequently presented with the reciprocal, centred and
delivered reward scheme in that order. We cannot
determine from this series of experiments whether the
tamarins would perform differently had they experienced
the reward schemes in a different order than presented
here.
The results of these studies therefore show that
cottontop tamarins coordinate their actions and coop-
erate even in situations in which they will not be
immediately or equally rewarded for their efforts. How-
ever, the tamarins also showed some selfish motivation
and cooperated most consistently for equal rewards.
The pair-bonded tamarins rarely to never showed any
aggressive behaviours towards one another following an
inequitable distribution of rewards. The cooperative
social system of callitrichids and the strong pair bonds
between the dyads in this study may contribute to their
success on these tasks in comparison with more com-
petitive species or dyads without strong social
relationships.
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